I’m not quite as well-versed on WWII as the War of Northern Aggression, but still pretty up on things, so here goes – with the caveat that I know fellow military-history buff AW1 Tim is going to find the inevitable error. (Dammit!)
I’m sticking to field commanders here, commanding Army Groups, Armies, Air Forces or Fleets. That means we take commanders like Ike, Mountbatten, MacArthur and – unfortunately – Nimitz off the playing field. Not that MacArthur would have had a chance of making the list in my book anyway. The loss of the Philippines was inevitable in 1942, but Mac made it so much easier for the Japanese by failing to protect his air assets or consolidate his supplies when the attack began. Much of the rest of his record in that war – despite the hype – was average at best.
Monty doesn’t come close to making the list either. The guy made a reputation on one battle: El Alamein, which – though decisive – took him weeks to prepare against an enemy who had severe logistical problems. As much of an ego-maniac as MacArthur or Patton, Montgomery had far less reason to strut than either. He got stopped cold at Caen after D-Day and Market-Garden was a disaster. I’ve never been much of a fan of Bradley either, while – in my view – William “Big Simp” Simpson and Walter Krueger don’t get nearly the credit they deserve. Of the Russians, Ivan Konev did a remarkable job for a guy who started out as a political commissar, but he doesn’t quite make the cut. Curtis LeMay deserves a hat tip too. All that said, here we go:
#5: Admiral William Fredrick “Bull” Halsey, Commander Third Fleet – The demoralized, disgraced Pacific Fleet needed strong leadership after Pearl Harbor and the brusque, determined old salt that was Bull Halsey provided it. Though he was trained to be a “battleship admiral,” he recognized that the navy’s future lie in aviation when few others did, taking instruction as a pilot (he was only required to take classes in aerial observation) before assuming command of the carrier USS Saratoga before the war. Throughout the Pacific campaigns, he employed naval air power with devastating effectiveness, supporting invasions and raiding Japanese bases and shipping lanes. Though illness kept him out of the decisive battle of Midway, the instrument he helped create performed brilliantly under less imaginative leadership. The one blemish on his record is the Battle of Leyte Gulf, where he allowed himself to get suckered by a feint and only the remarkable audacity of an outgunned American force and the timidity of the Japanese Admiral attacking it prevented disaster.
Oops, I meant “Slim” not “Sim”…
#4: Field Marshal William Joseph “Bill” Slim, Commander His Majesty’s Fourteenth Army – The best general of World War II that you’ve never heard of, it would be hard to keep from ranking Slim number one, if this list were based on ability alone. Slim has been described by some military historians as the greatest military commander of the twentieth century and it’s very, very difficult to argue with that assessment. He led his undersupplied, outnumbered troops in Burma into battle against a seemingly superior enemy on a forgotten front and not only survived, but ultimately emerged victorious. Defying the stereotype of the typically aloof British commander, Slim was disarmingly unpretentious and his troops adored him. He was both an imaginative innovator and an inspiring leader. “Uncle Bill” to the men he led, William Slim was both an inspiration and a revelation, proving what determined soldiers could accomplish when properly led. His leadership tied the hands of tens of thousands of Japanese troops and therefore saved the lives to countless Americans in the Pacific theater.
#3: General George S. Patton, Commander Third Army – What? Not higher than number three!? Well, I stand second to none in my admiration for Patton, but I couldn’t figure out a way to put him atop the next two. Audacious, skilled and driven, Patton won his campaigns because he understood the American soldier and his enemy in equal measure. That he did so using an inferior weapon – the Sherman tank – to its best advantage is all the more remarkable. From North Africa to Sicily to the break out in France through that amazing, unprecedented, change of front to relieve the 101st in Bastogne, Patton’s record is breathtaking. There’s no doubt but that he was a Class A sumbitch, particularly to his subordinate commanders, but he always pointed to the enviable casualty records of his commands as proof that being a bastard ultimately saved lives. It’s a damned shame that Ike didn’t give him the gas when he wanted it while Hitler was on the ropes, instead of funneling fuel to Monty so he could pursue his “bridge too far.”
#2: Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Commander First Belorussian Front – I’m still not sure why Zhukov wasn’t shot before he could become the most important Russian commander of World War II. Given all the advantages in manpower and space that Russia enjoyed, it was pretty difficult to imagine Hitler conquering the Soviet Union, but Stalin gave it his best shot and Zhukov was one of the few to give Stalin a dose of reality and live to tell about it. After Stalin threw away millions of troops in pointless attempts to stand fast against Nazi pincer movements – against Zhukov’s advice – the Soviet leader finally gave in. Zhukov organized the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, enabling Mother Russia to husband her resources in each case to eventually deliver crushing blows to Hitler when the time was right. He was an important part of stopping the last major German attack on the eastern front at Kursk and, together with Konev and Rokossovsky, led the drive that ultimately resulted in the fall of Berlin. We shouldn’t understate the role that Russia played in defeating Hitler and, if we accept that, Zhukov is undoubtedly the best Soviet commander of the war.
#1: Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding , Commander Fighter Command – Taciturn, opinionated and lacking in social skills, Dowding’s nickname was “Stuffy.” Searching for a suitable billet commensurate with Dowding’s years in service and unquestionable intelligence, his superiors settled on Fighter Command. After all, in the inter-war years, everybody “knew” that the bomber would always get through. Ergo, fighters didn’t matter, so what better place for Stuffy? Arguably, England and democracy would not now exist but for that decision. Dowding, with characteristic arrogance, didn’t buy into any of that “the bomber will always get through” rot. He oversaw the development of the underappreciated Hurricane fighter and of the marvelous Spitfire. He set up the “Dowding system” of radar installations, sector stations and fighter bases that would prove decisive in the Battle of Britain. When Churchill and others wanted to send Fighter Command’s forces into France on a doomed mission, Dowding fought them off and thus preserved England’s defensive capability. It was Dowding’s tenacity, brilliance and foresight that enabled a happy few to fend off the Nazi hordes and preserve representative government. He remains a hell of man to whom more people owe a debt of gratitude than they can possibly imagine.
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OK so why is that English git ahead of Patton? EH? HA!
But not really a ha…the English and I do mean the English, not the rest of the denizens of British isles, which means Ireland, Scotland, Wales etc. have issues with the American soldier. Lets just say it has become apparent that they think we can’t fight. GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRr And that is bull hockey!
That was Monty’s real issue with Patton and George Patton was a million times more the General and commander than that bloody Bernard Law Montgomery the ego of the Empire.
LeMay was a decent air tactitian but as a strategist he couldn’t get past his fly boy ego. Hey zoomie, need boots on the ground to win the war. OK?
Dowding did a decent job keeping Goering away from England but if you look at the historical record to see what the Germans had going on, Hitler never intended to actually invade. And as for Georgie Zhukov….BOOOO HISSS! BOOO!
@Stephanie: Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery had nothing but good things to say about the American Soldier. The American Soldier, to Monty, was a brave and couragous fighter who could be relied upon to stand and fight in amost any situation but their problem, according to Monty, was that their commanders didnt take enough care of them.
There were only two members of the Allied high command who visited the front regularly – one was Patton, the other was Montgomery – and of all the Allied commanders Montgomery was the only one who took the time to not only provide everything his soldier might possibly need (including a brothel) but to also insure that soldiers under his command knew what they were doing, why they were doing it and what their part in the coming battle would be.
To Montgomery, a man who went out of his way to insure his soldiers got the best and were taken care off as best as possible and always informed about as much as possible, the attitude of the American Generals to expect their men to live on bare necessities and follow orders without question while staying away from the front themselves and living in luxury was like looking back on WW1 and the British commanders who sent their soldiers to such blood baths as the Somme and Passchendaele.
General Brian Horrocks – commanding the XXX Corps of the 2nd British Army – was appauled when he worked alongside the US Army to find that the American Soldiers had to make do with cold rations and limited drinks, had very little to protect them during winter, never had their commanding officers speak to them and were expect to follow orders without knowing why. The British Army on the other hand got three hot meals a day, was supplied with more than their fair share of drink, got blankets and hot drinks during winter, knew exactly who was commanding them and what kind of person that man was and knew what they were supposed to be doing and why they were doing it.
American Soldiers were always suprised when they came under Montgomery’s command to find Monty touring their outfits and giving them in depth talks up coming operations and pep talks. Many of them never even had their division commanders speak to them and suddenly there came the top British Field Commander in Europe to their outfit to talk to them personally.
One good thing about the American General was that, as Horrocks said, they learnt quickly and only a short while after working alongside the British they had begun to provide for their soldiers to a higher degree than they had before but a bad thing about the American General was that they forgot quickly and stopped providing properly for their men once they were further away from the British.
Montgomery, furthermore, didnt really have a problem with Patton. Montgomery was the only man who refused to let knowledge of Patton slapping two shell-shocked soldiers circulate in his army, he was genuinly impressed with Patton’s mobility in Sicily, and he considered Patton to be the best “thruster” (that is the best attacker)in the Allied Armies but he did have one cricitism of Patton – that being that Patton had a tendency to ignore plans if he felt a opportunity for personal glory could be had instead.
Patton considered himself Montgomery’s rival but Monty never considered Patton a rival at all. While Patton was incredible insulting towards Montgomery and everything Monty ever did or said, Monty hardly spared Patton a second thought except as a subordinate to be used by himself or Bradley. It was one of the most onesided rivalries in history because only one man actually thought there was one.
A little late to the discussion…..sorry but your too late. Find a newer one OK? Or go botehr someone who actually cares.
I don’t see how it’s too late to discuss WWII.
I agree with Mike, how can it be too late to discuss WW2? WW2
(I accidently posted too soon)
WW2 ended in 1940′s and there are still many frequented and active forums with heated debates that discuss the events of the war today. Its the same with the American Civil War – that finished in the 1860′s and there are still heated debates about the war today. Considering that the first response to this list was only in May 2010 I think calling it too late to discuss anything is a bit silly.
And if your honest with yourself you’ve said that because I said stuff about Montgomery that you dont agree with and that if you took a moment to think about with unbiasedly would challenge the preconceptions you hold about him.
Hi Rich, could you recommend some books or biographies of those Commanders in your list? I’m ashamed to admit I only know of Patton.
For Stuffy I’d recommend “Fighter” by Len Deighton.
“the underappreciated Hurricane fighter.” Hell yes. According to Deighton, the following happened more than once: a Hurricane fighter shot down a Bf109 German fighter over Britain, the German pilot survived and was captured, and responded to the Hurricane fighter’s claim by saying he could not possibly have been shot down by a mere Hurricane, it must have been a Spitfire! And the British authorities denied the Hurricane fighter credit for the kill on the word of the German!
I’ve studied some on Marshall Zhukov, and he was definitely what saved the Soviet “bacon” during the war. He was the most decorated Soviet and Russian officer in history, a record he still holds. He died in 1974.
Not that Air Marshall Dowding doesn’t deserve some kudos, but I’d say the Germans didn’t do themselves any favors when they switched from going after the RAF, to bombing London. If they’d kept after the RAF they actually might have been successful, in spite of “The Few”.
Not as up on WWII as I would have been if you’d have ask this question when I was 18…but wait there wasn’t an internet then. But I would add “Vingar Joe” Stillwell to that list, he not only hung on while commanding the CBI, he managed to do a pretty good job with very few assets.
General Doolittle’s running of the 8th Air Force was also worthy of note.
I don’t think this guy falls within your parameters, but Hub Zemke, commander of the 56th Fighter Group, “The Wolfpack” was a fighter commander second to none. Also Col. Don Blakeslee comannder of the 4th Fighter Group out of Debbin. Those two fighter groups took out a good many German fighters in the ETO.
Also, IMHO Patton should be at the top of that list. There was no better tactician on the Allied side period.
@ Vincent, for Halsey check out “Bull Halsey” by Elmer Belmont Potter (not sure if he’s related to Mr. Potter of It’s A Wonderful Life or not). Slim’s autobiography “Defeat Into Victory” is also worth a look. Can’t recommend anything off-hand on Zhukov, but I’m sure there’s a lot out there.
@ Steph and Outlaw, I don’t think you can go wrong with putting Patton or any of the top three on top. Not dissing Patton of course – I just tend to be a contrarian I guess. And, IMHO, Hitler was closer to executing Sea Lion than some historians think. It’s a controversial subject of course, but I think had Goering been able to establish air superiority Adolf would have rolled the dice again. He did assemble thousands of barges after all. Given the sorry state of the English Army in the fall of 1940, if the Germans could have established a beach head, it would have been a much different war – thus my appreciation of what Dowding did. That said, Outlaw is right: had Fat Hermann stuck with the strategy of going after airfields and radar installations, Dowding’s work would have gone for naught. It’s always nice to have a stupid enemy.
@ Outlaw: Agree with you on Doolittle, nice catch. Not as big a Stillwell fan as you methinks, but he still deserves a nod. Claire Chennault probably deserves a mention too, though he had his downside as well.
Very interesting.
Trzupr, you need to do more of these kinds of lists. I really enjoy them!
Very informative, and enjoyable, Rich!
Possibly a post on World’s Worst Military Tactitions?
The list would be too long I’m thinking.
Patton is not good enough to be placed in a top ten list of Allied WW2 generals let alone third on a top five. He never rose above Army Command, he made no higher command decisions in his life, he was always the subordinate to someone else and he had no great battle victories to his name. His only moment of greatness was the turning of the third army at the Battle of the Bulge but beyond that he did no better than any other Allied Army Commander – in fact it could be argued that he did worse than General Simpson of the 9th US Army and General Patch of the 7th US Army.
Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery, Mark Clark, Jacob Devers, Harold Alexander and Dwight D. Eisenhower were all more important to the Allies than Patton was, and all had a far bigger impact on the war than Patton did.
If you had to chose some of the Allied top Brass then you should have picked Field Marshal Alanbrooke – Chief of the Imperial General Staff – and General George Marshall – US Chief of Staff.
Alanbrooke had the biggest impact of any Allied General on the war in Europe. It was his overall strategy that was employed – against the arguments of Marshall. He was instrumental in reigning in most of Churchill’s most wild and reckless ideas and his part in chosing the commanders of the British forces insured that the dead weight at the top level was drummed out of service and more effective men took their place. Alanbrooke forced the Allies to clear North Africa of Axis forces, neutralize Italy through invasions of Sicily and the Italian mainland and open the Mediterranean for Allied shipping before invading France. Alanbrooke also forced the Allies to invade only Northern France for Operation OVERLORD because there was a large movement in the American camp to invade Southern France at the same time but Alanbrooke believed it would only disperce manpower and weaken the Allied invasion force. If Marshall had gotten his way the Allies would have invaded Europe the moment the Americans came into the war and that would have been a disaster. The one thing he never managed to do that he wanted to was to get Turkey into the war on the Allies side. It was one of the greatest mistakes of the Allies to reduce the power of CIGS in Europe when SHAEF was activated because Alanbrooke had proven himself one of the greatest and arguably THE premier strategics at the Allies disposal but once SHAEF was activated Eisenhower pretty much ignored him and CIGS lost most of its power in Europe.
Marshall, on the other hand, was the man most responsible for organizing the American war effort. He dealt with the recruitment, training, provision and command set up for all American Forces – many of the American’s top generals were either hand picked by him or picked on his recommendation. It was Marshall’s job to decide where American’s main priority lay and he was the man who chose what theater got what terms of supply and manpower. He played a massive part in preparing the American Army and Airforce for the invason of mainland Europe and as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff he helped decide the strategy for the invasion of Europe and the post-invasion phase (though he eventually, and controversially, left that to Eisenhower). No other general in the American forces had as much credit for organizing the victory over Nazi-Germany and Japan as did Marshall.
To place Patton in front of either of these men is criminal and laughable.
Back to the original list: the issue of Montgomery.
Bernard Montgomery founded his reputation as an army commanding general on El Alamein but it wasn’t his only victory ever and he didn’t achieve nothing after El Alamein.
He was wounded several times in WWI and almost died in No Mans Land – having to take shelter under the body of his dead Sgt to survive. During the between-war years Montgomery was one of the most travelled and experienced soldiers in the British Army and had seen tours of duty from Ireland to Eygpt, Palenstine and India before becoming a teacher at the Indian Army Staff College. Monty was a gifted teacher because he had a god given gift of being able to explain the most complicated of things in the simplest of terms. Also during the between-war years he became involved in debates over the use of armour and there was a rather public forum between Basil Lidell Hart and Monty over the issue – Hart was a proponant of the blitzkrieg style of warfare while Montgomery was a proponant of combined arms and total preparedness. In 1938, after impressing General Wavell with a amphibious operation of his own design and organization, Monty was promoted to command the 8th Infantry Division and ruthlessly squashed an Arab revolt in Palestine in July 1939 before returning to Britian to take command of the 3rd Infantry Division.
When Britain declared war on Germany Montgomery travelled as a part of Lord Gort’s – John Vereker’s – BEF. He was appauled with Gort’s command style because Gort, though undoubtedly brave and inspirational – a Victoria Cross winner after all, attempted to do nothing to prepare his army for the coming battles. The lack of attentiveness and effort from Gort convinced Montgomery that the BEF were going to be driven to the sea when the Germans came but, he decided, his division would not be. He spent the entirity of the “Phoney War” training the 3rd Infantry Division in defensive operations and tactical retreats. Monty’s dedication got him the attention of Alanbrooke.
When the Germans attacked the Anglo-French forces in the Battle of France the BEF were, as Monty predicted, driven to the sea at Dunkirk but his training had paid off. The 3rd Infantry Division – the “Iron Division” – was never troubled by its enemy, it advanced and withdrew in complete professionalism and at times it was all that saved the BEF and their allies from complete destruction. Further it was the most complete division to return to Britain with almost all its men and equipment still intact.
The performance of the Iron Division once more brought Montgomery to the attention of Alanbrooke who promoted him to command the II Corps of the BEF during the evacuation of Dunkirk.
He was responsible for in a large part for the retraining of the British Army after Dunkirk. In this he was ruthless, demanding complete professionalism and fitness from everyone under him including the staff officers. Those who couldn’t keep up were sacked with immediate effect. So successful was he that he was placed in command of South-Eastern Command overseeing the troops and defenses in Kent, Surry and Sussex, the closest area to the European Mainland. He renamed it South-Eastern Army, promoted an offensive spirit within the troops and conducted the largest military exersize to that date to show the professionalism and preparedness of his troops – Exersize Tiger.
As commander of the South-Eastern Command he was called upon to take part in the planning the Dieppe Raid and he did so. However once it became clear to him that the Royal Navy and the RAF would not give the operation the support it needed he called it to be scrapped and considered it to be so. When it was launched he had no idea it had been resurrected and was in North Africa.
When Monty took over the 8th Army it was a confused mess. Inventive and original though Auchinleck’s plans were, they were complex and confusing and no one really knew what they were supposed to be doing. Monty took command days before the scheduled transfer was to happen because he couldn’t abide this confusion. He inherited a strong position from Auchleck but nothing else. The troops were exhausted and demoralized, the officers were in a similar state with the addition of not knowing what they supposed to be doing and the armour, airforce, artillery and infantry were almost operating as seperate independent forces.
Monty sorted all this out quickly. He threw the Auk’s confusing plans out the window in favour of a simple static defensive plan at Alam el Halfa ridge, he issued difinitive orders to all under his command and provided his officers and his soldiers with a clear view of what was going to happen and how they going to beat Rommel and he moved the HQ’s of the infantry, armour, artillery and airforce to one place by the sea so they be working in close quarters with each other. He, as was his usual method, put the army into a massive re-training schedule. Within less than a month he had turned a beaten, confused and demoralized army completely around.
At Alam el Halfa, 28-29 days after first taking command, Montgomery defeated Rommel. He had laid a minefield and sent false information through the line to trick his enemy and when Rommel attacked he was repulsed with ease. Rommel, before Alam el Halfa, had stockpiled his supplies so he had enough to reach the Suez Canal at least if he won his next offensive and actually outnumbered the British but a couple of thousand men and had superior weapons. Alam el Halfa was a major victory over the Afrika Korp but Monty refused to let the press call it such because he was afriad that if they did Rommel would withdraw before he could hit the knock out blow and he was convinced that Rommel would not withdraw as long as he didn’t think he had been beaten.
Monty spent the next almost two months increasing his manpower and material until he had a clear superiority over his enemy. He had told Churchill to back off and leave him to command in his own way when Churchill had attempted to prempt an attack because he knew the Americans were coming into the war and he knew he would be able to increase his advantages and increase his chance of victory. This something he cant be criticized for – its good generalship.
Rommel’s bad supply situation was his own fault because he had insisted on advancing into Egpyt against the advice of Kesselring and his own Quartermaster. The British then strangled his supply line via Royal Navy efforts in the Mediterranean and RAF efforts in North Africa but even then Rommel could have saved himself some trouble if he had withdrawn back into Libya but he refused to withdraw. Monty getting the advantage here is not a mark against him either – it is a mark againt Rommel if its anything.
Rommel had placed the largest minefield of WW2 at his front and the only way to reach him was to make a path through the minefield – removing the mines by hand and bayonet – and create avenues through them that the Armour and Infantry could advance through. It was a meatgrinder of battle and would have been so no matter who commanded the 8th Army.
Monty didn’t “let” Rommel escape after El Alamein. He persued relentlessly. His advance in persuit of Rommel was the fastest advance of any army of any country during the entire war and he fought with Rommel on three more occasions before Rommel went back to Germany – the last battle coming in Tunisia. Once Rommel was gone Monty defeated the Afrika Korp at the Mareth Line and advanced on Tunis where he took the surrender of the German forces.
In Sicily he advanced against the strongest defensive position on the island against the storngest of opposition and despite telling Alexander to let Patton go for Messina because Patton was in a better position to do so than him Monty’s 8th Army reached Messina only minutes after Patton. The race was in Patton’s mind and Monty had conceded the prise before it began, a division commander in the 8th Army wanted to beat the Americans but Monty was already turning his attention to the invasion of the Italian Mainland and Operation Baytown.
Monty opposed strongly Operation Baytown – the invasion of the boot of Italy, and is on record as saying it would be a waste of time and resources because the Germans would only use the region for delaying purposes. He was right as the Germans destroyed bridges and built roadblocks and the 8th Ary lacked the equipment needed to advance quickly past such obsticles. Before he left Italy he breached the Gustav Line before bad weather forced him to halt.
Montgomery became the Allied Ground Forces Commander for Operation Overlord and the tactical, strategical and logistical plans for the invasion of Normandy were left to him. He was the man who improved the COSSAC plan and made it into the OVERLORD plan. Montgomery’s responsibility as Allied Ground Forces Commander was to act as the overall commander for the whole operation from the British and Commonwealth on his left to the American’s on his right. He was Bradley’s superior throughout the operation and a overall credit and blame for the successes and failures in the American sector belongs to him – immediate responsibility belongs to Bradley. Similarly Miles Dempsey was responsible for the immediate tactical successes and failures in the British sector – such as Caen, Goodwood and Epsom – while Montgomery held overall strategical resposibility.
Overlord was Montgomery’s Victory.
In the aftermath of Overlord the Falaise Pocket was created and Monty remained in command of all Allied Ground Forces for the time being – despite Bradley being activated as the commander of 12th Army Group once Patton’s 3rd Army was activated. Monty ordered the Americans to drive to Argentan and the British and Commonwelath forces to drive to Trun, he then set the meeting place of the two pincers as Chambois. Bradley, without consulting Montgomery and acting entirely on his own, ordered Patton to go no further than Argentan. Bradley was worried about friendly fire incident that might occur should British/Commonwealth and American’s meet coming from different directions and he did not believe Patton would stand up to a proper German Army having fought only remnants before. Bradley stated that he prefered a strong shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Chambois but as a result the Faliase Gap remained open and Patton, denied his chance to close it, decided to go for Paris.
Eisenhower was then activated as Ground Forces Commander but when faced for the first time in his career with having to make strategical and deicisons – he had only ever been a figure head before – he made none. He was presented with two different options, support Montgomery’s plan to drive into Belguim and the Netherlands with a massed 40 divisions and aim for the Rhur while clearing the channel ports or support Bradley’s plan to drive on the Saar and Frankfurt while leaving 21st Army group to guard the flank and open the channel ports. Eisenhower chose to humour both men and thus the broad front strategy was born. It was strategy that wasted the victory achieved in Normandy and allowed the Germans to regroup and restore their defensive line at the Rhine while weakening the Allies with every mile gained and making the logistical situation untenable.
Montgomery became increasing frustraited with Eisenhower becasue all Eisenhower did was sit hundreds of miles to the rear in his HQ with no forward Tactical HQ to speak off playing quartermaster, mediator and statesman, issuing vague directives from afar but doing nothing to get them done and being so far out of the loop on current event that most of his directive were obsolete anyway. Monty’s continued call for a Ground Forces Commander under SHAEF as either him or Bradley – he would have prefered himself but accepted that polticially it would be easier for Bradley to have the job – was because Eisenhower wasn’t doing the job.
Before Market Garden Montgomery put in a plan for using 1st Allies Airbourne Army to clear the Scheldt Esturaries. This was Operation Comet. It was a limited operation that would see the Airbourne Army conduct an operation to the rear and offered only minor glory and as such it was vetoed immediately by Louis Brereton and Frederick Browing. Eisenhower made no attempt to force the Airbourne Army commanders to clar the Scheldt and made no attempt to tell Montgomery that clearing the Scheldt was a priority. Once Montgomery suggest Market Garden Eisenhower jumped at the chance to launch it and insisted that it go ahead no matter what.
Market-Garden was not a disaster. It was 90% successful – it needed to be 100% successful or it was worthless – and it came within a stones throw of success despite all the mistakes made in the planning and execution. It was a failure that has been elevate to a disaster by the shere size of the opportunity lost, not because it cost the Allies all that much.
The Hurtgen Forest Offensive was a disaster, the battle for Metz was close, both of them cost the Allies more than double the manpower, time, and resources lost in Market Garden, offered no better gains than Market Garden and left 12th Army Group stretched and weak when Ardennes offensive came.
When the Ardennes Offensive began Montgomery was as caught out as everyone else. There’s no shame in that, its how you react that proves whether you know your stuff. The reaction of the Allied High Command is kind of telling.
SHAEF went into meltdown trying to find out what was happening but was in a confused mess for days with Eisenhower completely ignorant of any events, Bradley ignored the attack and any request from Hodges or Simpson to come to the Northern sector and take command or issue orders and guidance as he was convinced the attack wasn’t all that serious, Patton initially thought it was an attempt to distract the American’s from his upcoming attack in the Saar region but by the time Eisenhower called his high command meeting Patton had realized his mistake and moved his Army to face the north, Hodges suffered a nervous breakdown and was at a complete loss (in a large part down to the fact that Bradley had offered him no help or orders when he requested it), Simpson was confused about events and where he should deploy his forces (again because of a lack of direction from above) and Montgomery, having recognized the danger of a successful German attack after only the first day and become concerned about the paralasis in the American command, moved the XXX Corps to the Muese river crossing and entrenched them – thus making any German victory impossible – and sent his Liason Officers forward into the American lines to find the American commanders – of any level of command – and find out what was happening and if that was impossible they were to judge the events themselves and report back to him daily, hourly if possible.
Montgomery was the only Allied general who showed any kind of grip on the situation and he was further the only Allied General who knew exactly what was happening in the Northern sector of the Ardennes. It got to such a stage that the British War Office and Churchill stopped relying on SHAEF’s reports to know what was happening and started relying on Montgomery’s messages to Alanbrooke because there was so much more information in them.
Transfering command of the 1st and 9th US Armies to Montgomery’s command was done for more than just administrative purposes. Bradley had refused to take command of the situation and allowed chaos to reign while Monty had sured up the front with the XXX Corp and got to grips with the situation. Two top SHAEF officers Strong and Whitely – who were both strong critics of Montgomery – both came independently to the conclusion that Monty had to get command of the Americans would collapse and Walter Bedell Smith, after talking to Bradley and reviewing the information about the situation gathered by SHAEF officers sent to 1st and 9th US Armies, came to the same conclusion an convinced Eisenhower of the need to change command, Only Whitely talked personally to Montgomery and it was Whitely who bridged the subject of giving Montgomery command.
Montgomery’s part in the battle was to turn a series of isolated actions of American untis into a clear and cohesive battle. He rearanged the line and strengthened it, he brought in British and Commonwealth forces as a reserve and intended to build Collins’ Corps as a mobile reserve to strike at the Germans while at the same time using the Canadians to bounce the Rhine. While Patton was attempting to strike the German flank and break through to Bastonge – but lacking the strenght to actually do it was going at a crawl – Monty had restored the Northern sector to order and ended the German attack. Hodges and Simpson were just glad to have some guidance from above again and followed Monty’s orders without complaint and in good spirit.
The press conference Monty gave overshadowed his good work and led to a rise in Anti-Monty feeling that continue to this day. Bradley’s own press statement a few days after Monty’s one – Bradley’s being unauthorized while Monty had been given the authority to talk to the press by both SHAEF and Churchill – that basically called Monty a lier and stated everything he had said was untrue certainly contributed to the American hatred of Monty.
The backlash from the press conference forced Monty to launch Collins’ attack early so the opportunity to bounce the Rhine was lost.
There after Monty crossed the Rhine successfully and advanced on Lubeck and cut the Soviets off from the Danish Peninsula then took the surrender of the Germans. He had put in place a plan to get into Berlin and had Eisenhower not cancelled it at the last moment and returned 9th US Army to 12th Army Group then 21st Army Group would have reach Berlin weeks ahead of the Soviets – whether they would have taken it or not is another matter.
Eisenhower may have been right to call of the attempt to go for Berlin but by removing 9th US Army from 21st Army Group for no other reason than to sooth Bradley’s brused ego he left 21st Army Group extremely weak and Monty was only just able to manage to reach Lubeck ahead of the Soviets. He could have reached it in half the time had he not lost Simpson.
Montgomery was the single most battle-tested and successful battle field commander in Europe that the Allies had. That was why he got command of the ground forces for Overlord and that was why SHAEF turned to him to clear up the mess in the Northern sector of the Bulge. It was also why Patton picked Montgomery to be his rival. Patton needed his rival to be the most successful Allied General in his area so that when he did something he could claim to have upstaged his rival and be all the better for his reputation and ego for it.
Montgomery commanded the biggest victories the Western Allies (excluding the Soviets) achieved in Europe and Africa. He gets a lot of criticism for things he shouldn’t get criticised for – things like taking advantage of superior manpower and material, increasing that advantage – he gets criticised for using things all Allied Generals had at their disposal – like superior manpower and material – he gets criticised for the failures of subordinate – Dempsey’s failures in Normandy mainly – he gets criticised for being slow and cautious – but in truth his advances in Africa was the fasted of the war and his advances in Europe was as fast as the American (Horrock’s XXX Corps was the fastest moving Allies force – beating Patton easilly) and his single thrust plan in addition to his Market Garden concept prove that he could be very adventurous and was not crippling cautious – in short, Monty gets a lot of stick where he shouldn’t mainly because of his unattractive personality not though any great fault in his command style.
As Monty’s success rate as a field command eclipses the rest of the Western Allies in Europe he should be an honourable mention if nothing else – a controverial one but no more so than Dowding, Zhukov or Patton – and considering your reasons for not considering him are that he took advatage of the situation in Africa to enhance his chances of victory and defeat a foe who overstretched himself and then you blamed him for the failures of a subordinate and exagerated the only real failure of his that you mentioned I think your reasons are quite petty.
Um yeah….yawn..
A horrible person, arrogant, concieted, egomanicial, opinionated, self-assured to an infuriating degree, insulting, condecending, ruthlessly and infuritating honest and open with opinions and an inability to compromise his views with others he definately was but, as Carlo D’Este stated in his articles for the Armchair General Website: “Overall, historians have been unkind to Montgomery….these judgments are mostly superficial and as often as not, wrong. He had a personality we love to hate and a record of accomplishment few could claim.”
The main reason Montgomery has recieved such heavy criticism over the years is because he made such powerful enemies amungst his own allies. Eisenhower, Bradley, Tedder and more all became Monty’s enemies and none pulled their punches criticising him for any little fault they could find, even if Montgomery had dealt with it in the midst of battle and changed what he was doing to win.
Another thing is that people focus too much on is what he said and not what he did. His conduct of the Overlord Campaign, particularly his part in the action around Caen, showed an incredible level of flexibility and adaptation but because he said everything went to plan people focused on where it didn’t and called that failure. That fact that Montgomery adapted his plan on a tactical level to keep his oringinal strategical aims viable and did so with great effect is overlooked for the tactical failures of the difficulty in taking Caen, Goodwood and Epsom (though what the actual aims of those last two were is indebate and this success and failure likewise).
To go back to D’Este for a moment and his first article on the Armchair General website:
“What I hope this article has conveyed is that superficial judgments based on one’s personality are meaningless, and in the case of Montgomery, have been, more often than not, dead wrong. Generalship must be judged on overall performance, in his case, on the basis of the entire war. No successful military commander is without hits and misses, enormous successes like Alam Halfa and Alamein, and disasters such as the Operation Market-Garden are not unusual.
One does not have to “like” Monty in order to appreciate both his generalship and his place in military history. Was he a “nice chap”? Of course not. He was no more likeable than controversial baseball slugger Barry Bonds. The revelation of his steroid use has tainted and obscured the fact that despite this enormous failing the man is still one of the greatest to ever play the game of baseball, and someday he is still likely to enter the baseball Hall of Fame. Honest and fair assessments of men like Bonds and Bernard Montgomery are hard to come by yet are vital if we are to truly understand these men.”